

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : FI Comments on the JCS Memorandum for the Special Group (CI), "Intelligence Requirements for Counterinsurgency," and its enclosure, "Essential Elements of Information for Counterinsurgency"

1. It is recommended that the subject memorandum and its enclosure be noted by the DEIB and referred to the member agencies for use by those components which are concerned with the development of intelligence requirements in support of counter-insurgency.

2. The chief use of the enclosure, "Essential Elements of Information for Counterinsurgency," would appear to be as a preliminary analytical tool for those with operational planning responsibilities in this field, to assist them in formulating their anticipated intelligence needs.

3. In its present form the enclosure should not be regarded as "a present and continuing high priority cold war intelligence requirement," as proposed in the last paragraph of the JCS memorandum. We observe that in forwarding it to the DCI, the Special Group (CI) did not endorse it as such but merely expressed a desire that "the memorandum be referred to the United States Intelligence Board for whatever action the members may consider appropriate."

4. The "Essential Elements of Information" is an abstract checklist of the kinds of information which should be considered in the formulation of specific intelligence requirements needed for the planning and execution of counter-insurgency actions. Its value lies in the spur which it may give to the thinking of persons developing such requirements. It would be inappropriate for the DEIB to give it official community-wide status, for the following reasons:

a. This is not a requirement in the strict sense at all. It is a type of formulation that is useful in the process of developing requirements.

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this paper should be related to the Priority National Intelligence Objectives and should receive their priorities from them. If there is a conflict, the issue of revising the PNO should be faced head-on.

c. The elements of this paper do not exist on the same level of priority. The mere fact that counter-insurgency is a subject of great importance does not mean that all the information pertinent to it is automatically of high priority in an intelligence context.

d. Before this document can be of great practical value in the intelligence community, it will be necessary to discriminate, country by country, between:

- (1) Information already on file.
- (2) Information obtainable overtly.
- (3) Information requiring clandestine collection
 - (a) and already being collected, or
 - (b) not now being collected.

e. When an analysis of the type described has been made, we believe that the number of ~~new~~ collection requirements necessary will be seen to be much less than would appear at first. Since counter-insurgency draws on virtually all knowledge of the country concerned, the really essential questions are how to exploit the knowledge we already have, and how to identify the gaps to be filled. This paper answers neither question.

5. These points are taken from the standpoint of the intelligence community. From the PI standpoint, we are particularly concerned lest we be presented with a list of "high priority" questions, many of which do not by any means call for the use of clandestine collection assets.

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Chief
Foreign Intelligence

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